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Abstract
This paper analyzes the economic implications of an environmental policy when we
take into account the life expectancy of heterogeneous agents. In a framework where
everyone suffers from pollution, but health status depends also on individual human
capital, we find that the economy may be stuck in a trap where inequalities persistently
grow, when the initial level of pollution is too high. Therefore, we study whether a tax
on pollution associated with an investment in pollution abatement can be used to reduce
inequalities and to improve endogenous growth. We obtain that a tighter environmental
policy may allow the economy to escape the inequality trap and hence to converge to a
long-term equilibrium without inequality, while it enhances the long-term growth rate.
However, if inequalities or pollution are initially too high, such a result does not hold
for reasonable tax rates.
JEL Classification: I15; O44; Q58
Keywords: Environmental Policy, Endogenous Growth, Human Capital, Inequality,
Longevity.
1 Introduction
While the average life expectancy has globally increased during the last decades, health
inequalities have not only persisted but widened sharply. For example, Singh and Siahpush
(2006) highlight that the absolute difference in life expectancy between less-deprived groups
and more deprived groups has risen by over 60% between 1980 and 2000 in the United
States. Such disparities in terms of life expectancy represent a worldwide phenomenon.
I would like to thank Alain Ayong le Kama, Mouez Fodha, Carine Nourry, Fabien Prieur, Natacha Raffin
and Thomas Seegmuller for their helpful comments. I am also grateful to participants at the conference
PET 2015 Luxembourg.
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OECD (2013) reports that on average the gap in expected years of life between men with
the highest level and the lowest level of education was of 7.8 years in 2010.1 In Europe, the
excess risk of dying among middle-aged adults in the lowest socioeconomic groups ranges
from 25% to 150% (Mackenbach , 2006). The extent of this problem has crucial impacts
on our societies, not only because health inequalities are unfair and costly in terms of
wellbeing, but also because it has important economic consequences, through increased
health and social costs, lowered productivity, discouraged investments in education and
savings, etc.. Therefore, addressing health disparities has become a major political issue
and many governments explicitly aimed to eliminate such inequalities, so far without success
(see e.g. reports of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services , 2000 or of the
U.K. Department of Health , 2003).
In this paper, we aim to study if an environmental policy can represent a useful tool for
removing existing health inequalities. The reason why we are interested in the role of the
environment in this issue is twofold. First, regarding determinants of life expectancy, there
is considerable evidence that pollution has a positive and significant effect on mortality (see
e.g. Bell and Davis , 2001 ; Pope et al. , 2002 ; Bell et al. , 2004 or Evans and Smith
, 2005). In particular, air pollution was found to be responsible for around 7 million of
premature deaths in 2012, representing 1 in 8 of total global deaths (WHO , 2014).2 At an
aggregate level, Pimentel et al. (1998) even show that 40% of the world deaths each year
can be attributed to direct and indirect effects of environmental degradation.
Second, a key characteristic of the relationship between the environment and health
seems to be the unequal repartition of the health effects of pollution across population.
In this sense, Stiglitz argues that “environmental degradation is everyone’s problem but
it is especially a problem for the poor, who are less able to respond effectively".3 This
observation is broadly supported by empirical studies, which provide evidence of an in-
creased susceptibility to mortality from pollution of disadvantaged populations in terms of
education and income (see e.g. Cifuentes et al. , 1999 ; Health Effects Institute , 2000 ;
Pope et al. , 2002 ; O’Neill et al , 2003 ; Laurent et al. , 2007 or Cakmak et al. , 2011).
For the United States, Zeka et al. (2006) reveal that the mortality risk associated with
particulate matter PM10 for low educated individuals is more than twice the size of the
risk for individuals with high education.4
Among the socioeconomic indicators, education is found to have the strongest effect
1More precisely, this value corresponds to the average expected years of life remaining at age 30 among
14 OECD countries.
2Specifically, air pollution plays an important role in the development of respiratory and heart diseases
(asthma, cancer, stroke...) which can be fatal.
3See his Resources 2020 lecture given in October 2012, http://www.rff.org/resources2020.
4This study deals with US population in twenty cities between 1989 and 2000. Low education corresponds
to less than 8 years of schooling, while high education refers to 13 years or more.
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on mortality, and to persist after controlling for other determinants such as income and
employment (see among others Elo and Preston , 1996 ; Lleras-Muney , 2005 ; Cutler
and Lleras-Muney , 2010 or Miech et al , 2011). For example, in 2009, the death rate
of individuals with low education (less than high school diploma) was 2.7 times higher
than for those with high education (with some college degree) in the United States.5 This
relationship appears to be due to several effects: more educated individuals are more likely
to live and work in better socio-economic conditions, but also to enjoy better information
leading to healthier behaviors and to have a better access to healthcare (see Kenkel , 1991 or
Laurent et al. , 2007). Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2010) find that the education gradient,
i.e. differences in health behaviors by education, is explained at 30% by income, health
insurance and family background, at 30% by knowledge and cognitive ability and at 10%
by social networks.
Therefore, empirical evidence suggests that life expectancy depends on pollution but
also on human capital, which is unequally distributed across population. The resulting
disparities in health effects of pollution observed among households, then raise the question
of the role that could play an environmental policy in reducing inequalities in the economy.
That is why we attempt to address the issue of health inequalities with such a policy
tool in this paper. More precisely, in a framework where life expectancy is endogenously
determined by the level of pollution and the individual human capital, we aim to analyze
the implications of an environmental tax whose revenue is used for pollution abatement on
inequality and growth.
So far, from a theoretical point of view, there has been an increasing interest for life
expectancy and its interaction with human capital and/or pollution but very little consider-
ation has been given to health inequalities. Indeed, the positive effect of human capital on
life expectancy has been taken into account in few contributions as Blackburn and Cipriani
(2002), Castello-Climent and Domenech (2008) or Mariani et al. (2010), which identify
the risk of an underdevelopment trap where education and longevity are low. In the same
way, the effect of pollution on health through the mortality channel has been studied in
several papers, without consensus on the effect of an environmental policy on the economy
and in particular on growth (see e.g. Pautrel , 2008 ; Jouvet et al. , 2010 ; Mariani et
al. , 2010 ; Palivos and Varvarigos , 2010 ; Varvarigos , 2011 ; Varvarigos and Zakaria ,
2013b or Raffin and Seegmuller , 2014).6 However, despite the widening health disparities,
none of the cited papers consider the uneven distribution of health. A notable exception
5See the Supplemental tables of the report “Deaths: Final Data for 2009" on the National Center for
Health Statistics website.
6Other contributions have also considered the morbidity aspect by considering the negative effect of
pollution on productivity or on human capital accumulation (van Ewijk and van Wijnbergen , 1995 ; Aloi
and Tournemaine , 2011 or Raffin , 2012).
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is Castello-Climent and Domenech (2008), who are interested in the relationship between
inequality and a longevity index determined by parents’ human capital. Focusing on a form
of human capital depending only on an investment in time, they find that the presence of
a trap, in which poor individuals have high mortality rate, is possible. Here, we extent
this analysis in order to take into account a more complete relationship between health and
inequalities. For that, we consider additional determinants of the stock of human capital,
i.e. the intergenerational transmission and the quality of the school system (average human
capital of society) as in Tamura (1991) or de la Croix and Doepke (2003), and we take
into account the effects of pollution on health. Moreover, in this framework, we study the
role of an environmental policy on inequalities and endogenous growth.
More closely related to our paper, Aloi and Tournemaine (2013) and Schaefer (2014)
take into account the relationship between health, pollution and inequalities. In their
models, households are heterogeneous in terms of human capital and suffer from different
health effects of pollution. On one hand, Aloi and Tournemaine (2013) formalize a model
where pollution has a direct effect on human capital accumulation and find that a tighter
environmental policy always reduces income inequality, as lower-skilled are assumed to be
more affected by pollution, and it can also improve growth, if the tax is not too high. On
the other hand, in a framework where the health effects of pollution and human capital
go through child mortality, Schaefer (2014) obtains that pollution impose an increase in
inequalities and a decline of growth, through the drop in the willingness of parents to
invest in education. Here, we first depart from these contributions by looking at a different
health mechanism, i.e. adult mortality. Moreover, in accordance with empirical evidence
mentioned above, we endogenize disparities in the effect of pollution on health, in the sense
that in our model the vulnerability of an agent to pollution depends on her level of human
capital and hence evolves with it.
More precisely, we formalize an overlapping generations model, where agents can live
up to three periods depending on their survival probability when old. Their longevity is
endogenously determined by their human capital and the level of pollution, in accordance
with empirical evidence. Pollution is represented as a flow due to aggregate production,
while human capital is the source of endogenous growth but also of the heterogeneity among
households.
We obtain that there may exist multiple balanced growth paths. There is always a
long-term equilibrium without inequality, while one or several long-term equilibria with
inequalities may also occur. Through a numerical illustration, we draw two cases. First,
the balanced growth path without inequality is the only one but is a saddle point, so that
it delimits a huge inequality trap. Second, this long-term state without inequality is stable
and coexists with a long-term equilibrium with inequalities delimiting an inequality trap
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with a smaller size than the first case. Therefore, we obtain that a trap where inequali-
ties persistently grow always exist, but its size depends on the parameters of the model.
Human capital is accumulated through intergenerational transmission, investment in edu-
cation done by altruistic parents and the educational system (represented by the average
human capital). The two former elements perpetuate inequalities, whereas the latter favors
human capital convergence. As we consider that longevity depends on pollution and on
the individual’s human capital, it follows that preferences for the future and the return on
investment in education evolve according to these variables. When pollution or inequalities
are high in the economy, lower-skilled agents die sooner, thus they benefit only for a short
period of time from their investment, and they have a lower return to educate their children.
It follows that the gap in human capital increases for the future generation.
When initial levels of inequalities and/or pollution are too large, the economy is stuck in
the trap where disparities worsen across time, but when these levels are sufficiently low, the
economy can converge in the long run to an equilibrium where inequalities vanish among
households. We find also that inequalities in terms of human capital and hence of health
have a cost in terms of growth and development in addition to the human cost, as the long-
term growth is always lower when there are inequalities. Therefore, the levels of inequalities
and pollution are crucial to determine the long-term situation if the economy. Moreover, the
fact that if the pollution intensity is high, the economy is likely to be stuck in an inequality
trap raises questions about the possible redistributive power of an environmental policy
and about its effect on growth.
We analyze if an environmental policy, that reduces pollution, can be sufficient to im-
prove growth and to reduce or eliminate disparities in the economy. We emphasize that a
tighter tax on pollution associated with an investment in environmental protection reduces
the size of the inequality trap and thus can allow the economy to escape from the trap.
It comes from the fact that lower-skilled households are more vulnerable to the negative
health effects of pollution than higher-skilled agents. Therefore, the improvement in en-
vironmental quality increases more the return on investment in education of lower-skilled
than the one of higher-skilled parents. However, a tighter tax on pollution may be insuf-
ficient to get out of the trap, especially for moderate tax rate. If the level of inequalities
and/or pollution are too high, the level of the tax on pollution required to overcome exis-
tent disparities may be very high. Consequently, such environmental policy is an efficient
tool to reduce inequalities in the short run and remove them entirely in the long-run but
the government should implement it as soon as possible, before the gap among agents is
too wide. Moreover, we show that a tighter environmental policy enhances the long-term
growth rate of the economy, through the positive effect of the decrease in pollution on life
expectancy and the resulting increase in preferences for education, which enhances human
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capital accumulation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the theoretical model. Section
3 focus on the long-term equilibria of the economy. The implications of the environmental
policy on the dynamics and growth are examined in Section 4. In Sections 3 and 4, we
provide analytical results followed by a numerical illustration. Finally, Section 5 concludes
and technical details are relegated to an Appendix.
2 The model
Consider an overlapping generations economy, with discrete time indexed by t  0, 1, 2,
..., 8. Households may live three periods, childhood, adulthood, and old age depending
on a longevity index. At each date t, a new generation of N heterogeneous agents is born.
We assume no population growth, so we normalize the size of the population (N) to unity.
Individuals are indexed by i  u, s, corresponding to the two groups of workers in the
economy, lower-skilled (u) and higher-skilled (s), of size ξ and 1 ξ respectively.7 The two
groups of agents are characterized by an inequality in initial endowment in terms of human
capital, so that agents born in t 1 differ only in the human capital level of their parents
(hut1   hst1).
2.1 Consumer’s behavior
Individual of type i born in t1 cares abouts her adult consumption level cit, her old-age
consumption level dit 1 and about the future level of human capital of her child through
paternalistic altruism hit 1. Preferences are represented by the following utility function:
lnpcitq   piit

β lnpdit 1q   γ lnphit 1q

(1)
with γ and β ¡ 0.
The weight piit represents the agent’s longevity or her survival probability in old age.8
A higher life expectancy enhances the welfare obtained from consuming when old, but
also from the future human capital of her child. Therefore, parents value more the future,
for them and for their children, when they live longer. Reversely, parents with shorter
life expectancy have shorter time horizons and hence put less weight on investment whose
return is future (including the future human capital of their children), not necessarily
7The reason why we refer to lower-skilled individuals as u and to higher-skilled individuals as s is that
the first category is relatively unskilled while the second is relatively skilled.
8Since individual i born in t1 lives 2 piit, we interchangeably use the terms “life expectancy", “longevity"
and “survival probability" in the paper. We will also refer to it as health, although it is just one measure of
health among others.
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because they are less altruistic but because they simply assess differently what is good
for their children.9 Note that, this assumption enables the longevity to affect positively
investments in education, in accordance with empirical evidence (see e.g. Jayachandran &
Lleras-Muney , 2009 or Hansen , 2013).
Longevity is an index of health status assumed to depend on individual’s human cap-
ital hit and pollution Pt in accordance with empirical evidence. As we mentioned in the
Introduction, the effect of human capital on health has been well established in empirical
studies and is explained by the fact that higher human capital mostly involves better living
and working conditions, better access to healthcare and better information about health
problems and prevention (see e.g. Kenkel , 1991 or Lleras-Muney , 2005). Whereas, in the
same way, there is considerable evidence that pollution has a positive and significant effect
on mortality, whether it goes through air, water, soil etc. (see e.g. Pimentel et al. , 1998;
Bell and Davis , 2001; Pope et al. , 2002 ; Bell et al. , 2004 or Evans and Smith , 2005).
For the sake of simplicity, we assume a functional form for the life expectancy index, which
is in line with the form adopted by Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), Chakraborty (2004),
Castello-Climent and Domenech (2008) or Raffin and Seegmuller (2014):
Assumption 1
piit  pi

hit
Pt



σhit{Pt
1  hit{Pt
(2)
with σ P p0, 1s, the upper bound of longevity. Thus, pit P r0, 1s, pi1phit{Ptq ¡ 0 and
pi2phit{Ptq   0.
During childhood, individuals are reared by her parents and do not make any decisions.
When adult, they supply inelastically one unit of labor remunerated at the wage wt per unit
of human capital. They allocate this income to consumption cit, savings sit and education
of their children.
We assume that the education of a child requires that her parent invests eith¯t units
of human capital, such that schooling time eit corresponds to an opportunity cost for the
parent of eith¯twt (as she does not use this efficient labor in production). Therefore, the
total cost of education is the same for all types of agents and is relatively more expensive
for poor parents.10 When old, agents only consume. In line with Yaari (1965), Blanchard
(1985) or Chakraborty (2004), we assume a perfect annuity market to abstract from the
risk associated with uncertain lifetimes. Therefore, households deposit their savings to a
9Alternatively, Mariani et al. (2010) explain that parents will be relatively more affected by the success
or the failure of their children if they live long enough to witness it. The same formalization is also adopted
by Osang and Sarkar (2008).
10This assumption is perfectly equivalent to the one of de la Croix and Doepke (2003) or Schaefer (2014),
where education is provided by teachers with a level of human capital equal to the average in the economy.
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mutual fund, which invests these amounts in physical capital. In return, the mutual fund
provides them an actuarially fair annuity during retirement, corresponding to their savings
increased by the gross return adjusted from their life expectancy Rt 1{piit.
The two budget constraints for an adult born in t 1 are:
cit   e
i
th¯twt   s
i
t  wth
i
t (3)
dit 1 
sitRt 1
piit
(4)
Human capital of her child hit 1 depends on the education eit, human capital of the
parents hit and average human capital h¯t, representing the quality of the school system.
hit 1  pe
i
tq
µphitq
ηph¯tq
1η (5)
with  ¡ 0, the efficiency of human capital accumulation. The parameters µ, η and their sum
µ  η all P p0, 1q.11 They are compatible with endogenous growth and capture respectively
the efficiency of education and the intergenerational transmission of human capital within
the family relatively to the transmission within the society.
The consumer program is summarized by:
max
eit,s
i
t
, Upcit, d
i
t 1, h
i
t 1q  ln cit   piit

β lnpdit 1q   γ lnphit 1q

(6)
s.t cit   e
i
twth¯t   s
i
t  wth
i
t
dit 1 
sitRt 1
piit
hit 1  pe
i
tq
µphitq
ηph¯tq
1η
The maximization of this program (6) leads us to the following optimal choices in terms
of education and savings.
eit 
piitγµ
1  piitpβ   γµq
hit
h¯t
(7)
sit 
piitβ
1  piitpβ   γµq
wth
i
t (8)
Higher-skilled households invest more in savings and in children’s education than lower-
11We assume that µ   η   1 so that human capital convergence is possible. Education choice depends
positively on hit and negatively on h¯t (representing the cost of education). Therefore, if µ   η ¡ 1, the
return of hit is always increasing and the return of h¯t is negative, such that human capital convergence is
impossible.
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skilled households. The reason for this is twofold. First, there is a traditional income effect.
The total wage of a worker depends on the wage rate wt, equal for all agents, and on the
level of human capital of this worker hit. Therefore, higher-skilled parents benefit from a
higher pay than lower-skilled one and can afford to spend more on education and savings.
Second, longevity plays also an important role in the optimal choices for education and
savings. An individual living a longer time gives more weight to the future. She saves more
to consume during the extended retirement period and invests more in her child education,
as she value more the future and will witness the returns of this investment. Moreover,
as stated above, individuals with higher education are likely to live longer, mainly because
they have better access to healthcare and are better informed, which allow them to adopt
healthier behaviors and to suffer less from the negative health effects of pollution. Therefore,
human capital disparities imply inequalities in life expectancy and hence in preferences for
the future, which translates into larger preferences of higher-skilled households for savings
and children’s education. Both the longevity effect and the income effect reinforce the
persistence of human capital disparities.
One can notice that the optimal choice in terms of child’s education is determined by
the relative human capital of parents (with respect to the average level of human capital
in the economy) rather than by the absolute level. The rational for this is that education
implies an opportunity cost associated with the investment in human capital agents have to
do to educate their children. This investment is the same for all and is equal to the average
human capital in the economy, in order to represent a standardized educational system
(where a unit of schooling time is equivalent for all types of agents). Thus, it implies that
the schooling time parents choose for their children depends on their relative human capital
and will be relatively more expensive for the lower-skilled parents.
2.2 Production
Production of the consumption good is carried out by a single representative firm. The
output is produced according to a constant returns to scale technology:
Yt  AK
α
t L
1α
t (9)
where Kt is the aggregate stock of physical capital, Lt is the aggregate efficient labor supply
to production, A ¡ 0 measures the technology level, and α P p0, 1q is the share of physical
capital in the production. Defining yt  YtLt as the output per unit of labor and kt 
Kt
Lt
as
the capital labor ratio, we have the following production function per unit of labor:
yt  Ak
α
t
9
The government collects revenues through a tax rate 0 ¤ τ   1 on production, which is the
source of pollution. The firm chooses inputs by maximizing profits p1τqYtRtKtwtLt,
such that:
wt  Ap1 αqp1 τqkαt (10)Rt  Aαp1 τqkα1t (11)
2.3 Pollution
In this paper, we focus on the effect of pollution on health. Considering air pollution
which represents the world’s largest single environmental health risk according to the World
Health Organization, we notice that its direct harmful effect on human health corresponds
to the level before absorption, deposition or dispersion in the atmosphere. Moreover, air
pollutants identified as the most significant health threats, i.e. particulate matter and
ground-level ozone, remain in the atmosphere only for short periods of time (from hours
to weeks). Thus, we choose to consider pollution as the flow currently emitted in the
economy.12 The same choice has been done theoretically by Pautrel (2008) and Aloi and
Tournemaine (2013) among others.
Environmental degradation is a by-product of the current production process (Yt 
ytLt). The government can use the revenue of the pollution tax (τ) to reduce pollution,
by providing a public environmental maintenance Mt ¡ 0. This public maintenance, also
called pollution abatement, represents a public investment in favor of the environment.
Considering air pollution, governments may implement clean air strategies to reduce the
use of fossil fuels through investment in renewable energy or subsidy of green transportation
(public and private) for example.
Keeping in mind that we focus mainly on air pollution, it is clear that such environmental
damage is not exclusively due to production activities but also to transportation, energy
consumption etc. Thus, in order to consider the effect of the whole economic activity on
pollution, we weight the pollution flow by the total labor force (h¯t) over the labor used in
the production of the consumption good (Lt). Therefore, we define the law of motion of
pollution as:
Pt  paytLt  bMtq
h¯t
Lt
(12)
where the parameters a ¡ 0 and b ¡ 0 correspond to the rate of pollution flow and the
efficiency of environmental maintenance respectively.
The government budget is balanced at each period such that the level of public envi-
ronmental maintenance is equal to Mt  τytLt. Then, the pollution flow at a period t can
12Considering pollution as a stock rather than a flow would increase the effect of pollution on health and
the importance of environmental policy, but would make the model much more complicated.
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be rewritten as:
Pt  pa bτqyth¯t (13)
Thus, pollution is composed of two elements. While production per unit of efficient labor
yt (which depends on capital intensity kt) represents an index of pollution intensity, the
aggregate human capital h¯t corresponds to a “scale effect". Indeed, even if human capital
is not pollutant per se, it defines the scale of economic activities and hence of pollution
emissions.
In order to ensure that human activities lead to a positive pollution flow regardless the
tax level, we assume:
Assumption 2 a ¡ b
3 Equilibrium
The market clearing conditions for capital and labor are given by:
Kt 1  ξs
u
t   p1 ξqsst (14)
and
Lt  ξrh
u
t  e
u
t h¯ts   p1 ξqrhst  est h¯ts (15)
The presence of eith¯t illustrates the investment of parents in terms of human capital, which
does not enter the production of the consumption good. The values of eit and sit are given
by the optimal choices of consumers (7) and (8) with the wage corresponding to (10). Thus,
the market clearing conditions can be rewritten as:
Kt 1  Ap1 αqp1 τqkαt

ξhut
piut β
1  piut pβ   γµq
  p1 ξqhst
pistβ
1  pist pβ   γµq

(16)
and
Lt  h¯t

ξxut
1  piut β
1  piut pβ   γµq
  p1 ξqxst
1  pistβ
1  pist pβ   γµq

(17)
The variable xit 
hit
h¯t
corresponds to the relative human capital of an individual i in period
t. Using (5), the relative human capital of her child is described by:
xit 1  

piitγµx
i
t
1  piitpβ   γµq

µ 1
gt
pxitq
η (18)
with gt  h¯t 1h¯t , the growth factor of average human capital. From the definition of the
average human capital (h¯t  ξhut   p1 ξqhst ), we can deduce the expression of the growth
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of human capital:
gt  pγµq
µ

ξ

piut
1  piut pβ   γµq

µ
pxut q
µ η   p1 ξq

pist
1  pist pβ   γµq

µ
pxst q
µ η

(19)
And the pollution flow corresponds to:
Pt  pa bτqAk
α
t h¯t (20)
We can rewrite the longevity given in (2) in terms of the individual relative human capital
and of the capital-labor ratio:
piit  pi

xit
Pt{h¯t



σxit
pa bτqAkαt   x
i
t
(21)
Equations (16), (17) and (18) characterize the dynamics of the economy.
Definition 1. Given the initial condition K0 ¥ 0, hu0 ¥ 0 and hs0 ¥ 0, the intertemporal
equilibrium is the sequence pkt, xut , xst qtPN such that the following dynamic system is satisfied
for all t ¥ 0:$'''''''''''''&
'''''''''''''%
kt 1 
Ap1τqp1αqkαt
gt

ξxut
piut β
1 piut pβ γµq
  p1  ξqxst
pist β
1 pist pβ γµq


ξxut 1
1 piut 1β
1 piut 1pβ γµq
  p1  ξqxst 1
1 pist 1β
1 pist 1pβ γµq
1
xut 1  

piut γµ
1 piut pβ γµq
	µ
1
gt
pxut q
µ η
xst 1  

pist γµ
1 pist pβ γµq
	µ
1
gt
pxstq
µ η
(22)
with gt and piit given by (19) and (21) respectively.
The evolution of the economy is summarized by the laws of motion of the physical to
labor ratio (k), and of the relative human capital of lower-skilled agents (xu) and higher-
skilled agents (xs). We can rewrite the dynamical system (22) by substituting the growth
of the average human capital by its expression given in (19). Moreover, from the definition
of average human capital, we can express the relative human capital of higher-skilled xst as
a function of the one of lower-skilled workers: 1ξx
u
t
1ξ . After some computations, it follows
that the dynamical system given in Definition 1 can be simplified as a two dimensions
system in terms of the capital-labor ratio in the production of the consumption good k and
the relative human capital of lower-skilled agents xu.
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$''''''''''''&
''''''''''''%
kt 1 
Ap1τqp1αqkαt
pγµqµ

ξxut
piut β
1 piut pβ γµq
  p1  ξxut q
pist β
1 pist pβ γµq


ξxut 1
1 piut 1β
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(23)
with piit given by (21).
Given the definitions of the average human capital and of the relative human capital, a
decrease in the relative human capital of lower-skilled individuals xu is due to a decrease in
the level of human capital of lower-skilled hu and/or to an increase in the level of human
capital of higher-skilled individuals hs. Moreover, a decrease in the lower-skilled relative
human capital corresponds to a proportional increase in the higher-skilled relative human
capital. Therefore, the lower xu is, the lower is the level of human capital of lower-skilled
workers respectively to higher-skilled workers, and hence the wider are disparities. Conse-
quently, we use the relative human capital of lower-skilled individuals xu to approximate
the level of inequalities in the economy.
In this section, we aim to analyze the long-run behavior of the economy. Thus, from
Definition 1, we specify:
Definition 2. A balanced growth path (BGP) is an equilibrium satisfying Definition 1 and
where the stock of physical and human capital grow at the same and constant rate (g  1).
At a balanced growth path, the capital-labor ratio kt, the growth of average human capital
gt, the relative human capital xit and the flow of pollution Pt are constant.
For technical reasons, the study of the existence of balanced growth path equilibria
is done in two parts. First, we analyze the case where xu  xs  1, at which there is
no inequality at the BGP. Second, we look at the case where xu  xs  1, which means
reversely that inequalities exist among households at the BGP.13
3.1 BGP without inequality: xu  xs  1
We examine first the existence of a BGP equilibrium where there is no inequality. In
this case, all individuals have the same human capital (hut  hst  h¯t), hence all the relative
13When x  1, rewrite the system (23) as two functions of k depending on xu requires to divide by zero
in the second dynamical equation.
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human capital levels xit are equal to 1. The dynamics of the economy described in (23)
when xu  xs  1 reduces to:
kt 1
1  βpit 1
1  pit 1pβ   γµq

Ap1 τqp1 αqβkαt
pγµqµ

pit
1  pitpβ   γµq
1µ
(24)
with pit  σ1 pabτqAkαt .
From this dynamical equation, we obtain that:
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2 and the conditions α   12 and  ¡ ¯, there
exists a balanced growth path without inequality pkE , 1, 1q with a positive growth rate (gE 
1 ¡ 0). This BGP is locally stable when η   η¯pτq and corresponds to a saddle point
otherwise. The thresholds ¯ and η¯pτq correspond to:14
¯ 

pa bτqAkαE   1  σpβ   γµq
σγµ
µ
and η¯pτq  1µ2pa bτqAk
α
E   p1  σpβ   γµqq
pa bτqAkαE   p1  σpβ   γµqq
Note that the BGP without inequality is always stable if µ  η Ñ 0 and is always a saddle
point if µ  η Ñ 1.
Proof. See Appendix 6.1.
From this proposition, we know that human capital accumulation has to be sufficiently
efficient ( ¡ ¯) so that the growth rate is positive at the long-term state without inequality.
Most importantly, we see that the economy may converge in the long run to a balanced
growth path without inequality among households.15 But it is not always the case. When
the equilibrium is a saddle point (η ¡ η¯pτq), the convergence toward the long-term equi-
librium without inequality is very unlikely. Thus, the economy will most likely exhibit
inequalities in the long run.16
Several effects intervene against and in favor of the human capital convergence. The
model combines channels usually found in the literature on human capital and inequality
(e.g. Tamura , 1991, Glomm and Ravikumar , 1992 or de la Croix and Doepke , 2003) and
the more uncommon longevity channel (see Castello-Climent and Domenech , 2008 for an
exception).17 First, the presence of parents’ human capital in the production of children’s
14The effect of τ on η¯pτq is detailed in Section 4.1.
15Such equilibrium is possible because agents differ only in the initial level of human capital. We do not
assume in this model that poor individuals are less able to acquire skills.
16Note that by definition 0 ¤ xu ¤ 1. Therefore, the economy can achieve the BGP where xu  1 only
for few initial conditions where xu0 is very high and k0 is very low. We analyze the extent of inequalities
when pkE , 1, 1q is unstable in Section 3.3, after determining if there are also BGP with inequalities.
17Castello-Climent and Domenech (2008) isolate the life expectancy channel by considering that human
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knowledge acts as a divergent force. This intergenerational spillover results directly in the
transmission of inequalities and hence in their persistence over time. Then, this channel is
reinforced by two other divergent forces leading to disparities in education choices among
parents. The income differential among parents, due to inequalities in their human capital,
implies that lower-skilled individuals can less afford the cost of educating their children.
Moreover, the life expectancy of an individual determines her preference for the future and
in particular for her child’s education. In our model, longevity is endogenous and depends
on individual human capital and pollution. It follows that lower-skilled agents have also a
poor health and give less value to education. The reverse occurs for higher-skilled parents
who are more able and willing to finance education. Thus, the gap among children’s future
human capital is widened by these divergent forces (through intergenerational transmission
and education). Finally, on the opposite, the presence of average human capital in the
production of human capital represents a convergent force, which is crucial to ensure that
human capital convergence is possible, as Tamura (1991) shows. In other words, the quality
of the school system has to be at least partly the same for all children in the economy, so
that they can achieve the same level of human capital in long run.
According to these effects, it emerges that the weight of the divergent forces, i.e. of
education and intergenerational transmission, in human capital accumulation has to be
not too high in order to avoid that poor agents are further disadvantaged and hence that
the poor-rich gap gets worse. Thus, we identify a condition in terms of the weight of
intergenerational transmission in the production of human capital so that the economy can
converge to an equilibrium where inequalities vanish (η   η¯pτq). Moreover, if the sum of the
weight of education and intergenerational transmission in human capital is at its maximum
(µ  η Ñ 1), the long-term equilibrium without inequality is always a saddle point, as the
convergent force is eliminated. Reversely, when it is at its minimum (µ  η Ñ 0), the BGP
is always stable as divergent forces are removed.
Note that the dispersion through the longevity channel will be even larger when pollution
is high. Lower-skilled households being more vulnerable to pollution than higher-skilled
households, the environmental damages amplify health disparities and hence human capital
inequalities. Thus, the levels of both inequalities and pollution intensity in the economy
modify the return on investment in education and favor the persistence of inequalities and
hence could play a key role in the determination of the long-term behavior of the economy.
However, we need to know if there are other BGP to conclude precisely on this point, which
is what we do in the rest of the section.
capital formation depends only on an investment in time. Thus, they do not consider the other aforemen-
tioned effects.
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3.2 BGP with inequalities: xu  xs
At an equilibrium with inequalities, the two groups of individuals (lower- and higher-
skilled) have not the same human capital (hut   h¯t   hst ), hence the relative human capital
of each goup xit differs from 1. By developing the dynamical system (22) with the explicit
form of longevity given in (21), we can rewrite the system at a balanced growth path with
inequalities as:$'''''''''''&
'''''''''''%
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(25)
The study of this system results in the following proposition on the existence of balanced
growth paths with inequalities:
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, for 2µ   η ¡ 1 and α   1{2, there exists at
least one BGP with inequalities when A   A¯pτq, with :18
A¯pτq 
#
pγµqµ
p1 τqp1 αqβσ1µ

2µ  η  1
µp1  σpβ   γµqq
µ 1  σpβ   γµq
pa bτq
1 µ η
2µ  η  1
 1α
α

σγµp1 µ ηq   p1  βσqµ
2µ  η  1
*α
Note that there is no BGP with inequalities in the extreme case where µ  η Ñ 0.
Proof. See Appendix 6.2.
While there always exists a balanced growth without inequality, one or several balanced
growth path(s) characterized by inequalities among households may also occur. More pre-
cisely, it is the case at least for a total factor productivity not too high. At such a long-term
state, human capital and longevity of individuals diverge across lower- and higher-skilled
individuals in the long run. The existence of a balanced growth path with inequalities stems
from the balance between the convergent force and the divergent forces in the formation
18The effect of τ on A¯pτq is detailed in Section 4.1.
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of human capital, that we have mentioned in the previous section. In particular, from the
condition A   A¯pτq, it follows that when the weights of intergenerational spillover and
dispersion in education choices, corresponding to the divergent forces, are zero (µ η Ñ 0),
there is no BGP with inequalities and the only long-term equilibrium is the BGP without
inequality, which is stable in this case.19 Thus, as we explained previously, the weight of the
divergent forces has to be sufficiently high so that inequalities can persist in the economy
in the long run.
More particularly, the existence of multiple balanced growth paths and in particular of
an inequality trap, where disparities among households are persistent or widening across
time, results from the fact that longevity is endogenous in our model. The life expectancy
of an individual depends on her level of human capital and the aggregate level of pollu-
tion. Therefore, pollution and human capital affect the returns of investment in education
through health. Indeed, at an individual level, more pollution or less human capital entail
that she will die sooner, hence her preferences for the future are lower and she benefits
less from her investment in her child education. Moreover, lower-skilled agents are more
vulnerable to the negative effect of pollution on health than higher-skilled agents. Thus, the
initial levels of pollution and inequalities shape the extent of disparities in terms of health
and return to education, and thus the level of inequalities for the next generation. More
precisely, pollution and inequalities determine if the growth of individual human capital is
higher for lower-skilled or higher-skilled households. Usually in the literature on human
capital and inequality, it is always higher for lower-skilled under the diminishing return of
the divergent forces in human capital accumulation (equivalent to the condition µ  η   1
in our model), so that human capital convergence occurs (see e.g. Tamura , 1991 or Glomm
and Ravikumar , 1992).20 In our model, despite the condition µ η   1, it is not always the
case. When the levels of pollution and/or inequalities are too high, the growth of individual
human capital can be lower or equal for lower-skilled, which implies that there exists an
inequality trap.21 Therefore, the extent of the dispersion through the longevity channel,
and more generally of the divergent forces, varies according to the initial conditions of the
economy in terms of pollution and inequalities, which are then determinant for its behav-
ior in the long run. Note that if longevity would be exogenous in our model, the growth
19A further analysis of the condition under which BGP with inequalities exist(s) is provided in the nu-
merical illustration in Section 3.3.2.
20In Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), when education is public, human capital convergence always occurs,
while when education is private, it is the case when the sum of the weights of private spending in education
and of intergenerational transmission in human capital formation are lower than 1.
21The individual growth of human capital gi is increasing and then decreasing in xi. The maximum value
of gi is achieved in xi   1, while gip0q  0 and gipMaxtxsuq ¡ 0. Thus, there exists a level of xu under
(resp. above) which the individual growth of human capital is lower (resp. higher) for lower-skilled than
higher-skilled agents gu   gs (resp. gu ¡ gsq.
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of individual human capital would always be higher for lower-skilled so that the economy
would always converge to the long-term equilibrium without inequality (under µ  η   1).
Analytically, we are not able to conclude on the dynamics of the long-term equilib-
rium(a) with inequalities. However, it is important to identify what scenario will take place
and under what conditions, that is why we will analyze numerically the number and the
characteristics of the balanced growth path(s) with inequalities in the next section.
3.3 Numerical illustration
In this section, we provide a numerical analysis of the model in order to describe more
precisely the long-term behaviors of the economy. After motivating the choice of the pa-
rameters value, we study in details the characteristics of the different balanced growth
paths.
3.3.1 Calibrations
To solve the model numerically, we give values to the parameters of technology and
preferences so that they fit empirical observations and projections of the US economy. We
calibrate the model assuming that a period represents thirty years. Therefore, an individual
starts working at 30, retires at 60 and may live for up to 90, according to her longevity. In
the real-business-cycle literature, the quarterly psychological discount factor is estimated
to 0.99 (see Cooley , 1995 or de la Croix and Michel , 2002). A period representing 30 years
in our model, β is set to 0.99120  0.3. We choose parameters to match US data on the
annual long-term growth rate (i.e. around 1.7%) and the US share of education expenditure
in GDP at the balanced growth path (i.e. between 5 and 8%).22 Thus, considering that
the two groups of workers have the same size (ξ  0.5)23, we set the scale parameter  to 6
and the preference for child human capital γ to 0.35.
The parameter µ represents the weight of education in human capital accumulation and
corresponds more precisely in our model to the elasticity of human capital with respect
to education. In the literature, the return to schooling in developed countries is estimated
between 8% and 16% (see Ashenfelter and Krueger , 1994; Psacharopoulos , 1994 or Krueger
and Lindahl , 2001). These figures correspond to Mincerian returns, which means that
they include only an opportunity cost (forgone earnings) and do not consider education
expenditure. Following de la Croix and Doepke (2003), we assume that an additional year
of schooling raises education expenditure by 20%. The resulting elasticity of schooling is
22See the long-term projections for the US economy of OECD (2014a) on the growth rate and the Digest
of Education Statistics 2012 of the US Department of Education for data on the education share.
23We will provide a sensitivity analysis with respect to the repartition of the population between the two
groups ξ in Appendix 6.5.
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from 0.4 to 0.8. Thus, we set µ to be 0.6. The weight of intergenerational transmission of
human capital η being a key parameter in our analysis, we will consider all values allowed
by the model, i.e. η P r0, 1 µq.
The weight of production in the pollution flow and of environmental maintenance are
chosen to satisfy the condition a ¡ b, ensuring that there is pollution emission in the pres-
ence of economic activities, i.e. a  0.6 and b  0.4. The parameter in the longevity
function σ is set to 0.9, so that the values of individuals’ life expectancy at the balanced
growth paths corresponds to realistic values (between 60 and 87 years).24 Finally, con-
cerning the production technology, the share of physical capital in the production of the
consumption good α is set to 1{3 in accordance with empirical data, and the total factor
productivity A is a scale parameter set to 1. Note that the value of A with those of the
other parameters, allows that the condition A   A¯pτq, such that there exists at least one
BGP with inequality, is always satisfied for a sufficient level of the tax τ P r0, 1q.
3.3.2 Long-term behaviors of the economy
First, we identify the different long-term equilibria of the calibrated economy and we
compare their characteristics. For the set of parameters considered, we obtain:25
Numerical result 1 piq When η ¡ η¯pτq, there exists a unique BGP, which is the one
without inequality pkE , 1, 1q. piiq When η   η¯pτq, there exist multiple balanced growth paths:
the BGP without inequality pkE , 1, 1q and an additional BGP with inequalities pkI , xuI , xsIq.
The two long-term equiliria are characterized by:
• xsI ¡ 1 ¡ xuI
• kI ¡ kE
• pisI ¡ piE ¡ piuI and piE ¡ p¯iI
• gE ¡ gI
First, it is worth noticing that the numerical analysis enables us to identify how many and
when the BGP with inequalities exist(s). We find that one equilibrium with inequalities
may exist, and more interestingly, that it is the case under the threshold η¯pτq, identified
in Proposition 1. Therefore, we have that, in the numerical illustration, this threshold
corresponds to the value under which the equilibrium without inequality is stable and
24While the lower bound is equivalent to the US life expectancy at birth in the thirties, the upper bound
is close the value expected by the US Census Bureau for 2060 (84 years).
25All the numerical results are obtained by considering the parameters η and τ with a pitch value of
0.000001 unit.
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under which the balanced growth path with inequalities appears, for all the levels of the
tax.
Concerning the characteristics of the economy, the long-term equilibrium with inequal-
ities corresponds to a state where there are persistent inequalities among households in the
economy. Higher-skilled agents are characterized by a higher level of human capital than
lower-skilled agents (xsI ¡ 1 ¡ xuI ). Moreover, at this state, the capital labor ratio is higher
(kI ¡ kE), which implies that the pollution intensity is also larger in I. This is essentially
due to the fact that average savings increase with inequalities, as they are convex in the
level of relative human capital. Due to a higher dispersion of human capital and a higher
pollution intensity at the BGP with inequalities, it follows that disparities in terms of health
are also higher at this equilibrium. While lower-skilled agents have a lower relative human
capital and suffer from the higher pollution intensity, higher-skilled workers benefit from
an increase in their relative human capital, which more than offsets the increase in the
pollution intensity. Therefore, at the balanced growth path I, rich individuals live much
longer than poor individuals (piuI   piE   pisI). Moreover, the average life expectancy in the
economy is higher at the long-term equilibrium without inequality (piE) than at the one
with inequalities (p¯iI), which means that the health cost of inequalities for poor is higher
than the benefit for rich.
Concerning the long-term growth which is driven by human capital, we obtain that it is
higher at the balanced growth path without inequality (gE ¡ gI). Several effects occur. The
average education is higher at the long-term equilibrium with inequalities I, as education is
convex in the relative human capital. In other words, the increase in the education choice
of higher-skilled parents, due to their higher longevity and income, outweighs the decrease
in the education choice of lower-skilled parents, arising from lower longevity and income.
However, human capital accumulation depends also on the relative human capital they
transmit to their children. At the BGP with inequalities, the associated dispersion harms
more lower-skilled than it benefits to higher-skilled. The net effect is that the long-term
growth is higher in the absence of inequalities. Therefore, inequalities have a cost in terms
of growth and development in addition to their human cost.
This result is supported by empirical evidence: OECD (2014b) emphasizes, for example,
that inequalities reduce growth, by making the poorer individuals less able to invest in
education. It contributes also to the wide theoretical literature on inequalities and growth,
surveyed in Galor (2011) and Sauer & Zagler (2012). More particularly, this finding
is in line with the modern approach of this issue, whose contributions demonstrate that
inequalities may be detrimental for economic growth, through their negative effect on human
capital formation.
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To identify the long-term behaviors of the economy, we analyze the dynamics at the
balanced growth paths and we obtain that:
Numerical result 2 piq When η ¡ η¯pτq, the unique BGP pkE , 1, 1q is a saddle point, with
a stable branch SSE. piiq When η   η¯pτq, the BGP without inequality pkE , 1, 1q is stable,
while the BGP with inequalities pkI , xuI , xsIq is a saddle point with a stable branch SSI .
Below SSj, with j  I, E, the economy is stuck in an inequality trap, whereas above SSj it
converges to the BGP without inequality.
The dynamics of the economy in the cases piq and piiq can be represented by the Figures
1 and 2 respectively.26
As the threshold η¯pτq represents the value above which the unstable BGP with inequali-
ties vanishes but also the value above which the BGP without inequality becomes unstable,
in the numerical illustration, there always exists an inequality trap, where disparities are
constantly widening.
The underlying mechanism behind the coexistence of an inequality trap and a long-
term equilibrium without inequality stems from the fact that the return on investment
in education varies according to the levels of inequalities and pollution intensity in the
economy, as we explained in Section 3.2. Indeed, longevity depends on both pollution
and individual human capital, which implies that agents have not the same vulnerability
to pollution. Consequently, the levels of both pollution and inequalities in human capital
lead to a wider dispersion of life expectancy. It means that the period of time during
which parents can benefit from their investment is very different among agents. Thus
their preferences for the future and the return to educate their children are also more
unequal. Due to endogenous longevity, the levels of pollution intensity and of inequalities
in the economy are crucial in the balance between the convergent force (i.e. average human
capital) and the divergent forces (i.e. intergenerational spillover, income dispersion and
longetivity dispersion) that drive human capital accumulation.
When the set of initial conditions is such that the economy is above the stable branch
SSj , the convergent force overcomes the divergent forces, as inequalities are not too wide
and the environmental quality is sufficiently high. Therefore, lower-skilled households have
a higher return to education investment than higher-skilled households. The growth of
individual human capital is larger for the more disadvantaged agents, which allow them to
narrow existing disparities over generations and to converge to an equal equilibrium in the
long run. Note that this result holds whether the unstable BGP is the one with inequalities
I or the one without inequality E. The economy can converge to E even if it is a saddle
26Note that the second dynamical equation in (23), represented by the blue curve, is discontinuous at
xu  1.
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Figure 1: Representation of the dynamics of the economy in the case piq
0 SSE 1 xu
kE E
kI0
k
Figure 2: Representation of the dynamics of the economy in the case piiq
0 xuI 1 xu
kE E
I
kI
kI0
SSI
k
22
point when its initial conditions are on the stable branch SSE but also above it (grey area
in Figure 1) as the relative human capital of lower-skilled agents xu is limited by definition
to r0, 1s. However, it corresponds to very few cases since inequalities and pollution intensity
have to be very low (xu high and k low).
On the contrary, when the initial conditions are below the stable branch SSj , disparities
and/or pollution intensity are initially too large (low xu0 and high k0), thus the divergent
forces outweigh the convergent force. In this case, the longevity dispersion leads to huge
disparities among households education. The return on the investment in education is
higher for higher-skilled agents, and the growth of individual human capital is lower for
lower-skilled agents. It entails that inequalities are too wide for lower-skilled agents to be
able to fill the gap and that the economy is stuck in an inequality trap where inequalities
will steadily increase. In particular, when the long-term equilibrium without inequality E
is a saddle point (η ¡ η¯pτq), the economy is in the trap for most of the initial conditions.
Moreover, the higher is the weight of intergenerational transmission in human capital ac-
cumulation η, the heavier is the weight of divergent forces and therefore the larger is the
size of the inequality trap.27
When the economy is in an inequality trap, it converges asymptotically to a state where
the level of inequalities is maximum pkI0, xuI0, xsI0q. The human capital of lower-skilled tends
to zero (xuI0 Ñ 0), as well as their income and their longevity piu. Therefore, poor agents
die at the end of the second period of life, before retirement. Moreover, they are not able
anymore of consuming, saving or educating their children so that the lower-skilled category
collapses. On the opposite, higher-skilled households become richer, more educated and
live longer. The physical capital to labor ratio and hence the pollution intensity are also
higher in this extreme state (kI0 ¡ kI). Finally, the long-term growth rate is the lowest at
this state gI0   gI   gE , which confirms that inequalities have a cost in terms of growth.
Note that such an extreme case, where the lower-skilled group collapses, is not achieved in
reality but it illustrates the constant worsening living conditions of the more disadvantaged
households in such a trap.
The study of the long-term behaviors of the economy reveals that the risk to be stuck
in an inequality trap, where disparities steadily increase, is important. This result is in line
with Castello-Climent and Domenech (2008) who show that an inequality trap can exist
due to the transmission of inequalities through life expectancy. Here, we extent their result
to the environmental dimension and emphasize that the initial levels of inequalities and
pollution in the economy are both crucial to determine if the human capital convergence
can occur or not. In particular, the numerical analysis points out that the economy is most
likely to be stuck in the trap when the pollution intensity is high, which raises the question of
27See the sensitivity analysis in Appendix 6.5 for more details on the effect of η on the results.
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the role that an environmental policy could play in breaking such vicious circle. Therefore,
the next section is devoted to the analysis of the consequences of an environmental policy
on the behavior and the growth of the economy in the long run.
4 Environmental policy implications
In this section, we assess the effect of a tighter pollution tax associated with an increase
in public maintenance on the dynamics and on the growth of the economy. In particular,
we want to know whether such an environmental policy can have a redistributive power, as
we emphasized the role of pollution intensity in the persistence of inequalities, and whether
it can allow to enhance the long-term growth, which is driven by human capital. For each
point, we provide, first, an analytical analysis of the implications of the policy, while we
illustrate them numerically in a second time.
4.1 Environmental policy implications on the balanced growth paths
From Proposition 1, we know that the stability of the long-term equilibrium without
inequality depends on the environmental policy, as the tax on pollution intervenes in the
threshold determining its stability η¯pτq. Examining how an increase in the pollution tax
affects this threshold, we make the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Under Assumptions 1 and 2 and for α   1{2, the threshold η¯pτq depends
positively on the tax rate τ . Thus, a tighter tax on pollution increases the range of param-
eters such that the long-term equilibrium without inequality is stable.
Proof. See Appendix 6.3.
When the tax on pollution is tighter, it allows the associated investment in environ-
mental maintenance to increase, which reduces the pollution flow. Thus, the longevity of
all agents increases, such that their preferences for the future and their investments in edu-
cation increase too. It implies that the level of human capital is higher. However, although
the individual growth of human capital increases for all levels of relative human capital, the
decrease in pollution affects relatively more lower-skilled households.28 Intuitively, even if
all agents suffer from the same level of environmental damages, higher-skilled individuals
are more able to protect themselves from the negative effect of pollution on health through
28More precisely, Bg
i
Bτ
¡ 0 but B
2gi
BτBxi
is ¡ 0 when xi is small and   0 when xi is high, with a threshold
equal to pabτqAk
αp2µ η1q
p1 σpβ γµqqp2µηq . Therefore, the increase in the tax reduces this threshold, so that there are
more levels of xi such that lower-skilled are more affected by the increase in environmental quality than
higher-skilled.
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knowledge, information, or financial means.29 Thus, public maintenance has a larger effect
on the return of investment in education of lower-skilled agents. All agents being pro-
portionally taxed, it follows that an increase in the tax on pollution makes more likely
the convergence toward the long-term equilibrium without inequality. Moreover, note that
there always exists a sufficient tax rate τ such that the BGP without inequality is stable,
i.e. η   η¯pτq.30
The environmental tax affects also the existence of long-term equilibria with inequalities.
The analysis of the threshold A¯pτq enables us to identify how it does.
Proposition 4 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, for 2µ   η ¡ 1 and α   1{2, the threshold
A¯pτq depends positively on the tax rate τ and the condition A   A¯pτq is always satisfied
when τ tends to 1. Thus, a tighter tax on pollution increases the range of parameters for
which there exists at least one BGP with inequalities.
A tighter tax makes more likely the existence of one or several balanced growth path(s)
with inequalities. However, to be able to conclude on the implications of this proposition
on the long-term behavior of the economy, we need to know how many such equilibria are
and their dynamics and we cannot evaluate these elements analytically in our model. That
is why we will analyze the implications of the environmental policy on the balanced growth
paths and on inequalities in the numerical illustration (Section 4.3).
4.2 Environmental policy implications on growth
The growth factor of human and physical capital at the balanced growth path without
inequality is given by:
gE  

σγµ
pa bτqAkαE   1  σpβ   γµq
µ
(26)
The study of the effect of the environmental policy on this long-term growth rate reveals
that:
Proposition 5 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, a tighter tax on pollution improves the growth
rate at the BGP without inequality (gE  1).
Proof. See Appendix 6.4
29As Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), we do not formalize health expenditures in this paper (neither
private nor public one), but we consider that individual human capital includes the capacity of agents to
spend in healthcare. For models with explicit healthcare spending, see e.g. Chakraborty (2004), Pautrel
(2008), Varvarigos and Zakaria (2013a) or Raffin and Seegmuller (2014).
30This is due to the fact that when the tax on pollution τ tends to 1, the threshold η¯pτq tends to 1  µ,
while we assume that η   1  µ.
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Several effects occur. On one hand, a tighter tax on pollution implies a negative income
effect. Firms report the pollution tax on the wage rates (wt) and the returns on savings of
households (Rt). On the other hand, a higher tax rate leads to more maintenance activities,
which decrease the level of pollution and hence improve health. Through this channel,
individuals’ longevity enhances, which leads to greater preferences for future motives in
the utility function, i.e. savings and children’s education. Concerning savings, the negative
income effect outweighs the longevity effect, such that savings decrease with a tighter tax on
pollution. However, concerning education, a third effect operates. It is important to keep
in mind that education is an investment in terms of human capital done by parents and
corresponds to an opportunity cost associated with the fact that they do not use this efficient
labor to produce, and hence are not paid for that. Therefore, the negative income effect of
the tax is neutralized by its positive effect through the reduction of the opportunity cost.
Education is thus only affected positively by the environmental policy through longevity.
It follows that the stock of human capital improves with the tax. Human capital being the
engine of growth in the economy, the long-term growth rate is also enhanced with a tighter
environmental policy.
4.3 Numerical illustration
We emphasized previously that the environmental policy has severals effect on inequal-
ities and a positive effect on growth at the long-term equilibrium without inequality. In
this section, we want to complete the analytical analysis to get a comprehensive overview
of the environmental policy implications.
Concerning inequalities, we pointed out in Section 4.1 that a tighter environmental
policy favors simultaneously the stability of the balanced growth path without inequality
and the existence of a balanced growth path with inequalities. With the numerical analysis,
we want to illustrate these findings and detail more precisely how the environmental policy
affects the long-term behavior of the economy for the parameters considered. Proposition 3
indicates that the tax on pollution increases the value of the threshold η¯pτq. Furthermore,
in the numerical illustration, this threshold represents the value under which the long-term
equilibrium E is stable but also the value under which the long-term equilibrium with
inequalities I exists. In other words, the equilibrium without inequality E becomes stable
when the one with inequalities I appears. Thus, it follows that:
Numerical result 3 piq When η ¡ η¯p0q, for low levels of the tax on pollution, there exists
only the BGP without inequality E which is a saddle point and delimits the inequality trap.
However, when the level of the tax becomes sufficiently high, η becomes lower than η¯pτq,
which implies that the long-term equilibrium without inequality E becomes stable, while the
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one with inequalities I appears and is a saddle point, delimiting the new trap.31
piiq When η   η¯p0q, the condition such that the BGP without inequality E is stable and
the BGP with inequalities I exists as a saddle point is satisfied for all levels of the tax on
pollution.
Therefore, we deduce that, when η ¡ η¯p0q, a sufficient tax on pollution allows to reduce
the size of the inequality trap, now delimited by the long-term equilibrium I. But beyond
this case, we obtain that:
Numerical result 4 An increase in the environmental tax decreases the size of the in-
equality trap. Thus, a tighter pollution tax can allow an economy to escape the trap and to
converge toward the BGP without inequality.
By decreasing the size of the trap, a tighter tax may reduce inequalities among house-
holds in short run and eradicate them in long run. The mechanism by which environmental
policy favors human capital convergence is detailed in Section 4.1. To sum up, a tighter
tax on pollution enables to reduce environmental damages, which improves the life ex-
pectancy of agents and hence their ability to look to the future. In this way, households
pay more attention to the education of their children. This effect is even stronger for the
more disadvantaged households, who are relatively more sensitive to environmental dam-
ages. Consequently, a tighter tax on pollution can allow unequal economies to escape the
trap and to reduce disparities along the convergence to a long-term equilibrium without
inequality.
To illustrate the Numerical Results 3 and 4, we use the Figure 3 corresponding to the
case piq where η ¡ η¯p0q as it includes the different scenarios. When η ¡ η¯p0q, we have that
η ¡ η¯pτq for low values of the tax on pollution, as in the phase diagrams paq and pbq of
the Figure 3. Then, the only long-term equilibrium is the one without inequality, but it
corresponds to a saddle point and hence delimits an inequality trap in which the economy
is stuck for most of initial conditions. The economy converges to the equilibrium without
inequality only if the levels of pollution intensity and inequalities are very low (on the right
of the dotted line). When the tax on pollution increases, the inequality trap goes to the left.
As one can see in the Figure 3, this is due to the fact that the blue curve, representing the
second dynamical equation in (25), goes up. Therefore, there are more conditions such that
the economy can converge to E. When the tax is sufficiently high (phase diagram pcq), the
condition η   η¯pτq is satisfied such that the BGP with inequalities I appears, E becomes
stable while I is a saddle. This change implies that the size of the inequality trap reduces
and that there are more conditions such that the economy can escape the trap. After that,
31Note that when τ tends to 1, η¯pτq is always greater than η.
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Figure 3: Phase diagrams when η  0.35, i.e. η ¡ η¯p0q, for different tax levels, with xu on
the X-axis and k on the Y-axis.
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when the environmental tax continues to increase, the trap continues to decrease, as the
BGP I continues to move to the left (phase diagrams pdq to pfq).
As we notice in Section 4.1, there always exists a level of the tax such that the economy
can escape the trap. However, the more society is unequal and the higher is the pollution
intensity before the strengthening of environmental policy, the higher is the tax rate nec-
essary to get out of the inequality trap. In extreme cases, the required tax can be close to
100%. It entails, that for reasonable levels of pollution taxation, the environmental policy
may be not sufficient to reduce inequalities. The term reasonable refers to the fact that
a tax whose level is too high restricts consumption and hence harms welfare. When the
economy is still in the trap after the increase in pollution taxation, it means that inequali-
ties are initially too wide and/or pollution intensity is initially too large to ensure that the
improvement in environmental quality is able to overcome the excessive initial disparities
on the return on education investment. Thus, inequalities continue to grow.
Consequently, we obtain that an environmental policy, consisting in a public investment
in environmental protection financed by a tax on pollution, is an efficient tool to reduce
inequalities, through its positive effect on health. Nevertheless, to escape the inequality
trap, the government should implement the environmental policy as soon as possible because
the later it reacts, the higher is the required level of the tax on pollution.
Our results are related to those of Aloi and Tournemaine (2013) who take into account
the effect of environmental policy on inequalities. In their paper, they assume that human
capital accumulation of lower-skilled individuals are more affected by pollution than higher-
skilled, but this difference depends only on the type of agents and not on their level of human
capital. Instead, we extent this mechanism by considering that the effect of pollution on
health, and in particular on longevity, is determined by the individual’s human capital
level, which affects her ability to protect herself through knowledge about pollution or
healthy behaviors, through access to healthcare... It follows that the return on investment
in education depends on the levels of inequality and pollution in our model and that the
economy may be stuck in a trap with widening inequalities or may converge to a long-term
equilibrium without inequality. As in Aloi and Tournemaine (2013), the environmental
policy leads to a decrease in pollution and favors the more disadvantaged agents. However,
in their model, a tighter tax on pollution always decreases inequalities, while it is not
always the case for us. The economy may escape the trap following an increase in the
tax on pollution when inequalities and pollution intensity are not too high. In this case,
inequalities reduce over time until they vanish in the long run. But when these variables
are too high, the increase in the tax may be insufficient, which means that the economy
continues to be more and more unequal. In this case, other kinds of policy are necessary and
can be combine with an environmental policy to favor both education of the less-advantaged
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agents and the environment, so that the economy can escape the trap. In particular, one
can think about an educational policy oriented toward the lower-skilled agents.
Concerning the effects of the environmental policy on the long-term characteristics of
the economy, we analyze in the numerical illustration what happens at the two balanced
growth paths E and I but also at the limit of the trap pkI0, 0, xsI0q, where inequalities are
maximum. We observe the following:
Numerical result 5 A tighter tax τ P r0, 1q decreases the long-term capital labor ratios
(kE, kI and kI0) and improves the long-term growth rates (gE, gI and gI0).
We emphasize in Section 4.2 that a tighter tax on pollution enhances the long-term growth
rate at the balanced growth path without inequality E. The numerical analysis illustrates
that it is also the case for an economy still in the inequality trap after the increase in
the tax. The mechanism is similar than the one exposed previously. The environmental
policy improves the life expectancy of all agents, which enhances their preferences for the
future and hence the return on their investment in education. Therefore, the growth rate
of average human capital increases. However, in this case, despite the fact that this policy
favors more lower-skilled than higher-skilled individuals, it is not sufficient to makes the
return to education of lower-skilled larger than the one of higher-skilled parents, so that
inequalities in human capital and life expectancy continue to get worse.
Note that, the tax on pollution reduces the flow of pollution in the short run and the
pollution intensity in the long run. Nevertheless, we do not know what is the effect on
the long-term pollution level, as the size of the pollution depends also on average human
capital which grows at the balanced growth path.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the implications of environmental policy on an economy char-
acterized by health disparities among its population. These inequalities stem from the fact
that the life expectancy of an individual depends on the level of pollution in the economy,
but also on her level of human capital. Even if everyone suffers from pollution, it is es-
pecially a problem for people with low human capital, through the lack of knowledge and
information or through difficulties in accessing to healthcare.
We show that multiple balanced growth paths may exist. The economy may converge
to a long-term equilibrium without inequality or be stuck in an environmental trap with
steadily increasing inequalities. The reason is that endogenous longevity makes the return
of the investment in education vary according to the pollution intensity and the level of
inequalities in the economy. More precisely, when the levels of inequalities or pollution
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increase, the life expectancy of lower-skilled agents decreases, which reduces the time they
enjoy from their investments and thus their preferences for the future. Moreover, these
decreases are in absolute terms but also relatively to higher-skilled agents. Therefore, the
gap among households in the economy grows. When the economy is initially not too unequal
and not too polluted, education is relatively more profitable for lower-skilled households, so
that inequalities can reduce over time and can disappear in the long run. But when initial
inequalities or pollution are too high, the return on investment in education may become
lower for lower- than higher-skilled households and inequalities among agents persistently
grow.
We reveal that an environmental policy, consisting in a tax on pollution and a public
investment in pollution abatement, can favor both the development of the economy and the
equality among households. First, a tighter environmental policy can allow the economy to
escape the inequality trap. The reason is that the improvement in environmental quality
increases more the return on investment in education of lower-skilled households, who
are more vulnerable to pollution. However, getting out the trap is not always possible
for reasonable tax rate. If the levels of inequalities or of pollution are too high initially,
the decrease in pollution may be insufficient to outweigh the bad education return for
lower-skilled agents. Second, we find that a tighter tax always enhances the long-term
growth of the economy. This is due to the positive effect of the decrease in pollution
on agents life expectancy which affects behaviors and promotes the investment for the
future, as education. We conclude in favor of an environmental policy as a tool to address
inequalities and enhance growth. However, it is not always efficient and the government
should implement such policy as soon as possible to ensure that inequalities reduce and
vanish in the long run.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
6.1.1 Existence and uniqueness of a BGP without inequality
We study the existence and uniqueness of a BGP without inequality (x  1). When
there is no inequality, the dynamics is given by (24). At this BGP, we have kt 1  kt  k.
We rewrite equation (24) as Ω1  Ω2 with:
Ω1  k
pa bτqAkα   1  βσ
pa bτqAkα   1  σpβ   γµq
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and
Ω2 
Ap1 τqp1 αqβkα
pγµqµ

σ
pa bτqAkα   1  σpβ   γµq
1µ
When α   12 and under Assumptions 1 and 2, we have:
• Ω1 is increasing and convex in k, characterized by Ω1p0q  0 and lim
kÑ 8
Ω1pkq   8.
• Ω2 is increasing and concave in k, with Ω2p0q  0 and lim
kÑ 8
Ω2pkq   8.
k0
6
-
Ω1
Ω2
kE
Figure 4: BGP without inequality
Moreover, Ω11p0q   Ω12p0q. Thus, the two curves cross only once and there exists a unique
positive BGP without inequality pkE , 1, 1q.
The growth factor at the BGP E corresponds to:
gE  

σγµ
pa bτqAkαE   1  σpβ   γµq
µ
(27)
Thus, the growth rate is positive if gE ¡ 1, i.e.:
 ¡

pa bτqAkαE   1  σpβ   γµq
σγµ
µ
 ¯ (28)
6.1.2 Dynamics of the BGP without inequality
To analyze the stability of the BGP without inequality pkE , 1, 1q, we compute the Ja-
cobian matrix associated to the system (23) in E:
JpkE , 1, 1q 


BF1
Bkt
pkE , 1, 1q BF1Bxut pkE , 1, 1q
BF2
Bkt
pkE , 1, 1q BF2Bxut pkE , 1, 1q

 (29)
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where F1 and F2 are two implicit functions given by the dynamical system (23), such that:
kt 1  F1pkt, xut q and xut 1  F2pkt, xut q. Therefore, we use the implicit function theorem
to obtain the elements of the Jacobian matrix.
The partial derivatives of the F2 at a BGP pk, xuq are given by:
BF2
Bkt
pk, xuq  µ

1ξxu
1ξ
	2 
p1ξqxu
1ξxu
	2µ η  pabτqAkα  1ξxu1ξ p1 σpβ γµqq
pabτqAkα xup1 σpβ γµqq

µ1

pabτqAαkα1p1 σpβ γµqqpxu1q
ppabτqAkα xup1 σpβ γµqqq2
 (30)
BF2
Bxut
pk, xuq 
p1ξqxu
1ξxu
	2µ η1 pabτqAkα  1ξxu1ξ p1 σpβ γµqq
pabτqAkα xup1 σpβ γµqq

µ1 
p1ξxuq2
1ξ
	

p2µ  ηq 1ξp1ξxuq2

pabτqAkα  1ξx
u
1ξ p1 σpβ γµqq
pabτqAkα xup1 σpβ γµqq


 µ x
u
1ξxu
p1 σpβ γµqqrpabτqAkα 1 σpβ γµqs
ppabτqAkα xup1 σpβ γµqqq2

(31)
The partial derivatives of the F1 at a BGP pk, xuq are given by:
BF1
Bkt
pk, xuq 
Ap1 τqp1 αqβ
pγµqµpV1V2q2
αkα1V3V1V2   kα

V 13V1V2  V3

V1V 12   V2
BF2
Bkt
pk, xuqW1
	
V4
(32)
with
V1  ξxu
pabτqAkα xup1 σβq
pabτqAkα xup1 σpβ γµqq   p1 ξx
uq
pabτqAkα  1ξx
u
1ξ p1 σβq
pabτqAkα  1ξx
u
1ξ p1 σpβ γµqq
V2  ξ
σµpxuq2µ η
ppabτqAkα xup1 σpβ γµqqqµ   p1 ξq
σµp 1ξx
u
1ξ q
2µ η

pabτqAkα  1ξx
u
1ξ p1 σpβ γµqq
	µ
V3  ξ
σpxuq2
pabτqAkα xup1 σpβ γµqq  
σ
p1ξxuq2
1ξ
pabτqAkα  1ξx
u
1ξ p1 σpβ γµqq
V4 
Ap1τqp1αqβkα
pγµqµ
V3
V2pV1q2

ξxu pabτqAαk
α1σγµxu
ppabτqAkα xup1 σpβ γµqqq2   p1 ξx
uq
pabτqAαkα1σγµ 1ξx
u
1ξ
pabτqAkα  1ξx
u
1ξ p1 σpβ γµqq
	2

  1
W1  ξ

pabτqAkα xup1 σβq
pabτqAkα xup1 σpβ γµqq 
pabτqAkασγµxu
ppabτqAkα xup1 σpβ γµqqq2

pabτqAkα  1ξx
u
1ξ p1 σβq
pabτqAkα  1ξx
u
1ξ p1 σpβ γµqq
 
pabτqAkασγµ 1ξx
u
1ξ
pabτqAkα  1ξx
u
1ξ p1 σpβ γµqq
	2
ﬀ
V 12  µσ
µpa bτqAαkα1

ξpxuq2µ η
ppabτqAkα xup1 σpβ γµqqq1 µ  
p1ξq

1ξxu
1ξ
	2µ η

pabτqAkα  1ξx
u
1ξ p1 σpβ γµqq
	1 µ
ﬀ
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V 13  σpa bτqAαk
α1

ξpxuq2
ppabτqAkα xup1 σpβ γµqqq2  
p1ξxuq2
1ξ
pabτqAkα  1ξx
u
1ξ p1 σpβ γµqq
	2
ﬀ
and
BF1
Bxut
pk, xuq 
Ap1τqp1αqkαβ
pγµqµpV1V2q2

W 13V1V2  V3

V1W 12   V2
BF2
Bxut
pk, xuqW1
	
V4
(33)
with
W 12  ξσ
µ

p2µ ηqpxuq2µ η1
ppabτqAkα xup1 σpβ γµqqqµ 
pxuq2µ ηµp1 σpβ γµqq
ppabτqAkα xup1 σpβ γµqqq1 µ

p2µ ηqp 1ξx
u
1ξ q
2µ η1

pabτqAkα  1ξx
u
1ξ p1 σpβ γµqq
	µ  

1ξxu
1ξ
	2µ η
µp1 σpβ γµqq

pabτqAkα  1ξx
u
1ξ p1 σpβ γµqq
	1 µ
ﬀ
W 13  ξσ

2xupabτqAkα pxuq2p1 σpβ γµqq
ppabτqAkα xup1 σpβ γµqqq2 
2 1ξx
u
1ξ pabτqAk
α 

1ξxu
1ξ
	2
p1 σpβ γµqq

pabτqAkα  1ξx
u
1ξ p1 σpβ γµqq
	2
ﬀ
At the BGP without inequality, BF2Bkt pkE , 1q 
BF1
Bxut
pkE , 1q  0, while BF1Bkt pkE , 1q and
BF2
Bxut
pkE , 1q are greater than 0. Therefore, the two eigenvalues are given by: BF1Bkt pkE , 1q and
BF2
Bxut
pkE , 1q. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, under the condition α   1{2, and substituting the
expression of kE given in (24) at the BGP pkE , 1, 1q, we have 0   BF1Bkt pkE , 1q   1. Thus,
the BGP E is stable iif BF2Bxut pkE , 1q   1, which is equivalent to:
1

2µ  η  µp1 σpβ γµqqpabτqAkαE p1 σpβ γµqq
	
¡ 0 (34)
When the condition given in (34) is satisfied, the BGP without inequality is locally stable
(a sink), otherwise it is a saddle point. This condition can be rewritten more clearly in
terms of η, as η   η¯pτq with
η¯pτq  1 µ2pa bτqAk
α
E   p1  σpβ   γµqq
pa bτqAkαE   p1  σpβ   γµqq
(35)
Thus, the BGP without inequality E is stable when η   η¯pτq and corresponds to a saddle
point when η ¡ η¯pτq. Note that when µ  η Ñ 0, the condition (34) is always satisfied, i.e.
the BGP E is always stable, while when µ  η Ñ 1, (34) is never satisfied, i.e. the BGP E
is always a saddle.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We study the existence and uniqueness of a BGP with inequality (xu   1   xs). The
dynamical system is described by (23) and depends on two variables k and xu. After
computations, the system at the BGP with inequalities, where xut 1  xut  xu  1 and
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kt 1  kt  k, corresponds to:$'''''''''''&
'''''''''''%
k1α pσγµq
µ
Ap1τqp1αqβ
 
pabτqAkα  1ξx
u
1ξ p1 σβq

rpabτqAkα xup1 σpβ γµqqs ξxupabτqAkασγµ

1ξxu
1ξ x
u
	
pabτqAkασ

p1ξxuq2
1ξ  ξpx
uq2
	
  1ξx
u
1ξ σx
up1 σpβ γµqq


ξpxuq2µ η
rpabτqAkα xup1 σpβ γµqqsµ  
p1ξq

1ξxu
1ξ
	2µ η
rpabτqAkα p 1ξx
u
1ξ qp1 σpβ γµqqs
µ
ﬀ
 1  0  Apk, xuq
k 

1 σpβ γµq
p1ξqApabτq
p1ξqxup1ξxuq
2µ η1
µ pp1ξqxuq
2µ η1
µ p1ξxuq
pp1ξqxuq
2µ η1
µ p1ξxuq
2µ η1
µ
 1
α
 Ψ2pxuq
(36)
6.2.1 Properties of the function Ψ2
The second equation of (25) defines k  Ψ2pxuq. Under Assumptions 1 and 2 and the
conditions 2µ  η ¡ 1 and α   1{2, the properties of this function are:
• SignpΨ12q  u1v  uv1 with:
u  p1 ξqxup1 ξxuq
2µ η1
µ  pp1 ξqxuq
2µ η1
µ p1 ξxuq   0
v  pp1 ξqxuq
2µ η1
µ  p1 ξxuq
2µ η1
µ   0
v1 and u1 are equal to:
v1 
2µ  η  1
µ

pp1 ξqxuq
µ η1
µ p1 ξq   p1 ξxuq
µ η1
µ ξ

¡ 0
u1  ξpp1 ξqxuq
2µ η1
µ   p1 ξqp1 ξxuq
2µ η1
µ
2µ η1µ

ξpp1 ξqxuqp1 ξxuq
µ η1
µ   p1 ξqp1 ξxuqpp1 ξqxuq
µ η1
µ

We rewrite this last equation as u1  Ipxuq J pxuq, where Ipxuq corresponds to the
first part (first line) of the equation and J pxuq corresponds to the second one.
 Ip0q  p1 ξq, Ip1q  p1 ξq 2µ η1µ ¡ Ip0q and I 1pxuq ¡ 0.
 J p0q   8, J p1q  2µ η1µ p1 ξq
2µ η1
µ   Ip1q and
J 1pxuq  2µ η1µ

ξp1 ξq

p1 ξxuq
µ η1
µ  pp1 ξqxuq
µ η1
µ
	
 µ η1µ

p1 ξq2p1 ξxuqpp1 ξqxuq
η1
µ  ξ2pp1 ξqxuqp1 ξxuq
η1
µ
	
(37)
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J 1pxuq is an increasing function of xu (J 2pxuq ¡ 0) which is always negative in
xu  0 but may become positive for high xu when ξ ¡ 1{2 (J 1p1q ¡ 0 when
ξ ¡ 1{2).
 u1 is negative as long as J pxuq ¡ Ipxuq. Thus, we can define a threshold
xˆu P p0, 1q under which u1 is negative and above which u1 is positive for high
level of ξ.
• The condition u1   0 is sufficient to ensure that Ψ12 ¡ 0. Thus, we show that there
exists a threshold xˆu P p0, 1q under which Ψ2 is an increasing function of xu and above
which Ψ2 may become decreasing (for high level of ξ).
• Moreover, Ψ2 ¥ 0 @xu, Ψ2p0q  0 and
lim
xuÑ1
Ψ2pxuq 

1  σpβ   γµq
Apa bτq
1 µ η
2µ  η  1
 1
α
¡ 0 (38)
6.2.2 Properties of the function Ψ1
The first equation of (25), Apk, xuq  0 allows to define k  Ψ1pxuq, with Ψ1pxuq, an
implicit function. Under Assumptions 1 and 2 and the conditions 2µ  η ¡ 1 and α   1{2,
we obtain that Ψ1p0q and Ψ1p1q are equal to two positive constants.
More precisely, in xu  0 we have:
Apk, 0q  0 ô k1α pσγµqµp1ξq22µηAp1τqp1αqβσ
pabτqAkα  11ξ p1 σβq
pabτqAkα 

1
1ξ
	
p1 σpβ γµqq
µ  1
ô k1α

pa bτqAkα   1 σβ1ξ

 Ap1τqp1αqβσ
1µ
pγµqµp1ξq22µη

pa bτqAkα   1 σpβ γµq1ξ
µ (39)
We analyze the properties of Ψ1p0q by studying the last equation. For that, we name the
function on the left side f0pkq and the function on the right side g0pkq. Their properties
are:
• f0 is increasing and concave in k, f0p0q  0 and lim
kÑ8
f0pkq   8.
• g0 is increasing and concave in k, g0p0q is equal to a positive constant and lim
kÑ8
g0pkq 
 8.
• In k  0, g0 ¡ f0. The two curves have not cross yet, thus Ψ1p0q ¡ 0.
• When k Ñ 8, we have lim
kÑ8
f0 ¡ lim
kÑ8
g0. Thus, the two curves cross only once and
for a positive and finite value of k.
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Therefore, Ψ1p0q is always a finite and positive constant.
In the same way, in xu  1 we have:
Apk, 1q  0 ô k1α pσγµqµAp1τqp1αqβσ pabτqAk
α 1 σβ
rpabτqAkα 1 σpβ γµqsµ  1
ô k1α rpa bτqAkα   1  σβs  Ap1τqp1αqβσ
1µ
pγµqµ rpa bτqAk
α   1  σpβ   γµqsµ
(40)
As previously, we stydy the properties of Ψ1p1q, by looking at the last equation. We name
the function on the left side f1pkq and the function on the right side g1pkq, whose properties
are:
• f1 is increasing and concave in k, f1p0q  0 and lim
kÑ8
f1pkq   8.
• g1 is increasing and concave in k, g1p0q is equal to a positive constant and lim
kÑ8
g1pkq 
 8.
• In k  0, g1 ¡ f1, the two curves have not cross yet thus Ψ1p1q ¡ 0.
• When k Ñ 8, we have lim
kÑ8
f1 ¡ lim
kÑ8
g1. Thus, the two curves cross only once and
for a positive and finite value of k.
Therefore, Ψ1p1q is equal to a finite and positive constant.
6.2.3 Comparison of Ψ1 and Ψ2
From the study of the properties of Ψ1 and Ψ2, we know that Ψ1p0q ¡ 0 and Ψ2p0q  0,
it entails that Ψ1p0q ¡ Ψ2p0q. It follows that if Ψ1p1q   lim
xuÑ1
Ψ2pxuq, there exists at least
one BGP with inequalities.
From Appendix 6.2.2, the condition Ψ1p1q   lim
xuÑ1
Ψ2pxuq is equivalent to f1pkq ¡ g1pkq
in k  lim
xuÑ1
Ψ2pxuq given in (38). We obtain that Ψ1p1q   lim
xuÑ1
Ψ2pxuq if A   A¯pτq with:
A¯pτq 
#
pγµqµ
p1 τqp1 αqβσ1µ

2µ  η  1
µp1  σpβ   γµqq
µ 1  σpβ   γµq
pa bτq
1 µ η
2µ  η  1
 1α
α

σγµp1 µ ηq   p1  βσqµ
2µ  η  1
*α
(41)
Thus, under Assumptions 1 and 2 and the conditions 2µ η ¡ 1 and α   1{2, the condition
A   A¯pτq is sufficient so that there exists at least one BGP with inequalities.
Note that when µ  η Ñ 0, Ψ2 corresponds to strictly negative values of k @xu, so that
there is no BGP with inequalities in this case.
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xu0
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Ψ2 for low ξ
Ψ2 for high ξ
xuI
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x1uI
k1I
1
Figure 5: A representation of the dynamics when xu  1 (with Ψ1 decreasing in xu)
Note that the condition 2µ  η ¡ 1 does not always imply that the condition η   η¯ of
Proposition 1 is not verified. Therefore, it is possible to have these two conditions verified
simultaneously, and hence to have both that the BGP with inequalities exists and that the
BGP without inequality is stable.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 3
The threshold under which the BGP E is stable η¯pτq is given by (35) in Appendix 6.1.2.
To analyze the effect of τ on the dynamics of E, we compute Bη¯pτqBτ :
Bη¯pτq
Bτ

µp1  σpβ   γµqqAkα1E
rpa bτqAkαE   1  σpβ   γµqs
2

bkE  pa bτqα
BkE
Bτ
	
(42)
The effect of the pollution tax on the dynamics at the BGP E depends on BkEBτ . To
compute this derivative, we use the dynamical equation (24) at the BGP:
Φpk, τq  k pa bτqAk
α   1  βσ
pa bτqAkα   1  σpβ   γµq
Ap1 τqp1 αqβkα
pγµqµ

σ
pa bτqAkα   1  σpβ   γµq
1µ
 0
The effect of τ on k in E is given by the implicit function theorem:
Bk
Bτ
pkE , 1q  
BΦ
Bτ
BΦ
BkE
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After computations, we obtain the two partial derivatives:
BΦ
Bτ 

 bAk1 ασγµ  Ap1αqβk
ασ1µ
pγµqµ rAk
αpa bp1 µp1 τqqq   1  σpβ   γµqs
rpa bτqAkα   1  σpβ   γµqsµ
	
rpa bτqAkα   1  σpβ   γµqs2
(43)
BΦ
Bk 

ppa bτqAkαq2   pa bτqAkαr2p1  βσq   σγµp1  αqs   p1  σpβ   γµqqp1  σβq
Ap1αqp1τqβαk
α1σ1µ
pγµqµ rpa bτqAk
α   1  σpβ   γµqsµ rAkαµpa bτq   1  σpβ   γµqs

rpa bτqAkα   1  σpβ   γµqs2
(44)
And, we have:
Signt
Bη¯pτq
Bτ
u  SigntbkE  pa bτqα
BkE
Bτ
u
Thus, Bη¯pτqBτ ¡ 0 iif:
bkE

ppa bτqAkαEq
2   pa bτqAkαEr2p1  βσq   σγµp1  αqs   p1  σpβ   γµqqp1  σβq


Ap1αqp1τqβαkαEσ
1µb
pγµqµ rpa bτqAk
α
E   1  σpβ   γµqs
µ rAkαEµpa bτq   1  σpβ   γµqs
 pa bτqα

 bAk1 αE σγµ 
Ap1αqβkαEσ
1µ
pγµqµ rAk
α
Epa bp1 µp1 τqqq   1  σpβ   γµqs
rpa bτqAkαE   1  σpβ   γµqs
µ
	
¡ 0
(45)
It can be rewritten as:
bkE

ppa bτqAkαEq
2   pa bτqAkαEr2p1  βσq   σγµs   p1  σpβ   γµqqp1  σβq

 pa bτqα

Ap1αqβkαEσ
1µ
pγµqµ Ak
α
Epa bq rpa bτqAk
α
E   1  σpβ   γµqs
µ
	
 p1  σpβ   γµqqAp1αqβαk
α
Eσ
1µ
pγµqµ rpa bτqAk
α
E   1  σpβ   γµqs
µ pa bq ¡ 0
(46)
Under Assumption 2, the condition bkE  pa  bτqαBkEBτ ¡ 0 is always verified. Therefore,
under Assumptions 1 and 2 and for α   1{2, the threshold η¯pτq depends positively on the
tax rate τ .
Moreover, under Assumptions 1 and 2, for 2µ  η ¡ 1 and α   1{2, the threshold A¯pτq
depends positively on the tax rate τ and the condition A   A¯pτq is always satisfied when
τ tends to 1. Thus, a tighter tax on pollution increases the range of parameters for which
there exists at least one BGP with inequalities.
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6.4 Proof of Proposition 5
We analyze the effect of the tax rate on the growth factor at the BGP without inequality
gE , given by (26). Its derivative with respect to τ is:
BgE
Bτ
 pσγµqµµrpa bτqAkαE   1  σpβ   γµqsµ1kα1E
"
bAkE  pa bτqAα
BkE
Bτ
*
The effect of the pollution tax on the growth at the BGP E depends on BkEBτ and more
precisely we have:
Sign
!BgE
Bτ
)
 Sign
#
bkE  pa bτqα
BkE
Bτ
+
From Appendix 6.3, we know that under Assumption 2, bkEpabτqαBkEBτ ¡ 0. Therefore,
under Assumption 2, we have that BgEBτ ¡ 0: the growth rate at the BGP without inequality
gE increases following an increase in the pollution tax.
6.5 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we analyze the robustness of our results with respect to two key pa-
rameters: the share of lower-skilled individuals in the economy ξ and the weight of inter-
generational transmission in human capital accumulation η. Note that this two sensitivity
analysis are done for a particular tax rate τ , i.e. τ  0 We have performed the analysis
for other values and results are similar but to save place, we have only reported here the
results for τ  0. Moreover, we show the impact of the tax on the economy in Table 3.
The effect of ξ, representing the repartition of the two types of individuals in the pop-
ulation, is illustrated in Figure 6 and Table 1. The share of lower-skilled individuals in the
population does not affect the value of the long-term equilibrium without inequality but
modifies the long-term equilibrium with inequalities. The higher the share of poor indi-
viduals in the population, the higher is the capital-labor ratio and the lower is the relative
human capital of lower-skilled at the balanced growth path with inequality. It entails that,
at this equilibrium, inequalities will be wider and that the growth will be lower. However,
the dynamics of both balanced growth paths remains the same. Thus, the threshold in
terms of initial inequalities under which the economy is in the inequality trap is lower. The
fact that a higher share of population is lower-skilled, for a same average level of human
capital, implies that the relative disadvantage of lower-skilled agents with respect to the
rest of the population is lower, which makes the human capital convergence easier.
Figure 7 and Table 2 illustrate the evolution of the two long-term equilibria with respect
to η, the weight of intergenerational transmission in human capital accumulation. As for
the share of lower-skilled households in the economy, an increase in the weight of inter-
40
Table 1: Sensitivity Analysis with respect to ξ when τ  0
ξ kI x
u
I gI CAGRI pi
u
I pi
s
I LE
u
I LE
s
I AverageLEI
0.50 0.0241 0.0955 1.5413 1.452% 0.3197 0.8250 69.5919 84.7485 77.1702
0.70 0.0271 0.0738 1.4473 1.240% 0.2615 0.8515 67.8435 85.5435 73.1535
0.90 0.0355 0.0480 1.2439 0.730% 0.1762 0.8818 65.2848 86.4547 67.4018
ξ kE gE CAGRE piE LEE EigenvaluesE EigenvaluesI
0.50 0.0209 1.6506 1.684% 0.7724 83.1706 t0.911051; 0.318788u t1.17236; 0.321711u
0.70 0.0209 1.6506 1.684% 0.7724 83.1706 t0.911051; 0.318788u t1.20855; 0.324857u
0.90 0.0209 1.6506 1.684% 0.7724 83.1706 t0.911051; 0.318788u t1.27981; 0.328051u
Notes: CAGRj represents the compound annual growth rate at the balanced growth path j  E, I,
while LEij corresponds to the life expectancy in years of the individual i at the BGP j.
0.0
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
1.0
k
xu
Figure 6: Sensitivity analysis with respect to ξ with τ  0, where the solid lines capture
the cases ξ  0.5, and the dashed lines capture the case ξ  0.9.
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generational spillover has no effect on the values of the variables at balanced growth path
without inequality E. On the contrary, at the long-term equilibrium with inequalities, it
reduces the capital labor ratio kI and increases the relative human capital of lower-skilled
xuI . It entails that the growth rate at the long-term equilibrium I is higher while the level
of inequality is lower. Lower-skilled individuals have a higher level of human capital and
live longer at this state. As we detail in Numerical Result 2, the dynamics depends on
η. For η   η¯pτq, the long-term equilibrium without inequality E is stable, while the one
with inequalities I is an unstable saddle point.32 Whereas for η ¡ η¯pτq, the unique BGP
E is a saddle. Thus, η¯pτq represents not only the value above which the BGP E becomes
unstable but also the value above which the BGP I disappears. The higher is the weight of
intergenerational transmission in human capital accumulation, the larger is the size of the
inequality trap. Indeed, up to the threshold η¯pτq, we have that the higher η, the larger is
the size of the inequality trap and the more likely the economy will converge to a situation
where the lower-skilled category collapses (see Figure 7 and Table 2 for some examples).
Above this threshold, the economy converges to the equilibrium without inequality only if
the initial levels of inequalities and of the capital to labor ratio are very low. Therefore, for
most of initial conditions the economy is stuck in an inequality trap.
Table 2: Sensitivity Analysis with respect to η when τ  0
η kI x
u
I gI CAGRI pi
u
I pi
s
I LE
u
I LE
s
I AverageLEI
0.20 0.0259 0.0444 1.4847 1.326% 0.1801 0.8251 65.4019 84.7530 75.0775
0.25 0.0241 0.0955 1.5413 1.452% 0.3197 0.8250 69.5919 84.7485 77.1702
0.30 0.0223 0.2365 1.6010 1.581% 0.5251 0.8213 75.7518 84.6403 80.1960
0.35 ∅ ∅
0.39 ∅ ∅
η kE gE CAGRE piE LEE EigenvaluesE EigenvaluesI
0.20 0.0209 1.6506 1.684% 0.7724 83.1706 t0.861051; 0.318788u t1.2362; 0.32274u
0.25 0.0209 1.6506 1.684% 0.7724 83.1706 t0.911051; 0.318788u t1.17236; 0.321711u
0.30 0.0209 1.6506 1.684% 0.7724 83.1706 t0.961051; 0.318788u t1.08036; 0.320204u
0.35 0.0209 1.6506 1.684% 0.7724 83.1706 t1.01105; 0.318788u
0.39 0.0209 1.6506 1.684% 0.7724 83.1706 t1.05105; 0.318788u
Notes: CAGRj represents the compound annual growth rate at the balanced growth path j  E, I,
while LEij corresponds to the life expectancy in years of the individual i at the BGP j.
Concerning the effect on environmental policy implications, we obtain that Numerical
Results 3, 4 and 5 hold for all the values of the share of lower-skilled households in the
population and of the intergenerational spillover.33 In other words, a sufficient increase in
32η¯p0q  0.34 and η¯p1q  0.4.
33It is always true considering the calibrated values for the other parameters and for all η P r0; 1µq, i.e.
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Figure 7: Sensitivity analysis with respect to η with τ  0, where the dashed lines capture
the cases η  0.2, and the solid lines refer to the case η  0.3.
the tax on pollution can allow the economy to escape the “inequality trap". Nevertheless,
when the weight of intergenerational transmission of human capital is very high (η ¡ η¯p0q),
the effect is a slightly more complicated as the BGP with inequalities does not exist for
low values of the pollution tax. We illustrate this case in Table 3. As we have noticed,
above the threshold of intergenerational spillover η¯p0q, the economy is most likely to be
stuck in the inequality trap when no environmental policy is implemented or when the tax
is too low. As η¯pτq is increasing in τ , when τ is sufficiently high, η becomes lower than
η¯pτq. Thus, the BGP with inequalities appears as a saddle point, while the BGP without
inequality becomes stable. In this way, the environmental policy makes that the economy
is more likely to converge toward the equilibrium E. For low level of taxation, the size
of inequality trap remains very important, but the tighter environmental policy, the more
there exist initial conditions such that inequalities among households disappear in the long
run. Finally, it should be specified that the required level of tax on pollution for that can
be close to 1, when inequalities are initially too wide and/or pollution is initially very high.
the values considered in the model.
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Table 3: Effect of a tighter environmental policy when η  0.35
τ kI x
u
I EigenvaluesI gI pi
u
I pi
s
I
0% ∅ ∅
5% ∅ ∅
10% ∅ ∅
15% ∅ ∅
20% 0.0153 0.7955 t1.00255; 0, 32123u 1.6714 0.7743 0.8129
25% 0.0140 0.6280 t1.00873; 0.322303u 1.6730 0.7551 0.8273
30% 0.0127 0.5195 t1.01515; 0.323757u 1.6746 0.7404 0.8367
35% 0.0115 0.4384 t1.02153; 0.323801u 1.6761 0.7277 0.8439
40% 0.0099 0.3705 t1.02825; 0.333258u 1.6784 0.7172 0.8507
45% 0.0091 0.3132 t1.03507; 0.325562u 1.6793 0.7032 0.8555
50% 0.0079 0.2647 t1.04206; 0.326975u 1.6809 0.6917 0.8605
τ kE x
u
E EigenvaluesE gE piE
0% 0.0209 1 t1.01105; 0.318788u 1.6506 0.7724
5% 0.0195 1 t1.00799; 0.318873u 1.6562 0.7785
10% 0.0181 1 t1.00493; 0.319171u 1.6618 0.7846
15% 0.0170 1 t1.00214; 0.315846u 1.6669 0.7903
20% 0.0153 1 t0.998773; 0.320744u 1.6730 0.7971
25% 0.0140 1 t0.995776; 0.320691u 1.6785 0.8032
30% 0.0126 1 t0.992667; 0.322809u 1.6841 0.8096
35% 0.0113 1 t0.989678; 0.323407u 1.6895 0.8157
40% 0.0101 1 t0.986708; 0.324157u 1.6949 0.8219
45% 0.0089 1 t0.983779; 0.324694u 1.7002 0.8279
50% 0.0078 1 t0.98089; 0.325017u 1.7054 0.8340
Notes: The value η  0.35 corresponds to the case where η ¡ η¯pτq in τ  0 and η   1  µ (its
maximum value in the model).
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